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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Plaintiff/Appellant Michael Bee filed his Notice of Appeal on September 27,
2007. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(j)
and 4, Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by rejecting plaintiffs

requested voir dire and otherwise failing to question prospective jurors so as to elicit their
exposure to negative reports about personal injury cases and their prejudice against such
cases?
The issue was preserved for appeal at RR. 1740-1742; 2226, 1:6-3:1; 2223,
6:15-44:15.
2.

Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting the two co-

defendants six peremptory challenges, when there was no "substantial controversy" between
them, even more-so because defendants had stipulated to dismiss a third-party action between
them?
The issue was preserved for appeal at R. 2223, 115:13-116:16.
3.

Did the trial court err by precluding as irrelevant, any and all evidence

of Anheuser-Busch's irresponsible, reckless, and deceptive alcohol marketing and
advertisements, the effectiveness of that marketing and advertisement, and the contribution
of Anheuser Busch's conduct in this regard to plaintiffs injuries and damages.
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The issue was preserved for appeal at RR.2223, 65:10-78:2, 81:12-82:4,
105:24-106:13,107:13-108:8.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Regarding Issue No. 1, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated,

"We review challenges to the trial court's management of jury voir dire
under an abuse of discretion standard. Generally, the trial court is
afforded broad discretion in conducting voir dire, 'but that discretion
must be exercised in favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice
in prospective jurors.'" Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (quoting State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470,472 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)) (other citations omitted).
Due to the strong interest in enabling parties "to elicit necessary
information for ferreting out bias," State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,^34,
992 P.2d 951, a trial court's discretion is most broad when it is
exercised with respect to questions that have no apparent link to any
potential bias. However, the trial judge's discretion narrows to the
extent that questions do have some possible link to possible bias, and
when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an
actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow such
inquiries. Id. at ^[43.
Depew v. Sullivan 2003 UT App. 152, 71 p. 3d 601, atffl 11, 12.
2.

Regarding Issue No. 2, the trial court has very limited discretion on a

Rule 47(e) decision to grant separate peremptory challenges to co-defendants. Carrier v.
Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 R2d 346, 353 (Utah 1997). The Utah Supreme Court stated:
All of the Pena factors, to one degree or another, support close
appellate review of trial court decisions under rule 47(c)
[(predecessor to rule 47(e))] of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court should have limited
discretion in its rule 47(c) decisions. On "the spectrum of discretion .
. . , running from 'de novo' on the one hand to 'broad discretion' on
the other," the appropriate discretion on this issue lies close to,
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although probably not at, the "de novo" end. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937.
Carrier, at 353.
3.

Regarding Issue No. 3, the trial court is given considerable discretion

in deciding whether proffered evidence is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d
1286 (Utah 1976).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this personal injury action, the trial court rejected plaintiffs requested
voir dire designed to reveal prospective jurors' exposure to negative reports about
personal injury cases and their prejudices against such cases. The trial court then granted
co-defendants six peremptory challenges, compared to the three allowed plaintiff,
although there was no "substantial controversy" between the defendants under Rule 47(e)
Utah R. Civ. P. Also, during the trial, the court precluded highly relevant, critical
evidence of Anheuser Busch's irresponsible, reckless, and deceptive alcohol marketing
and advertisements, which was probative of all the liability issues in the case, including
defendants' negligence, comparative fault, and recklessness justifying punitive damages.
The jury returned a verdict, finding plaintiff primarily at fault for his injuries.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Michael Bee fell and suffered brain, head, and neck injuries at the

2002 Bud World Party during the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, when defendants
served him alcohol to his intoxication, and then brought him onto an ice rink without a
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helmet or other protective gear, to participate in a hockey-puck shooting contest. R.
2223,1:6-3:3.
2.

Mr. Bee sued defendant Anheuser Busch, seeking compensatory and

punitive damages, and Anheuser Busch filed a third-party complaint against Prominence,
the event manager it hired to help with the Bud World Party. RR. 1-5, 40-45.
3.

Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint, asserting negligence

against and demanding recovery from both defendants. RR. 99-103.
4.

The morning of the first day of trial, the court heard argument on

plaintiffs requested voir dire, and rejected plaintiffs requested Nos. 1 through 4,
including their subparts. Addendum 1, RR. 1740-1742; R. 2226, 1:6-3:1; R. 2223, 6:1544:15. These were designed to reveal prospective jurors' exposure to negative reports
about personal injury cases and their prejudice against personal injury cases. Id.
5.

During voir dire, the trial court asked no questions to prospective

jurors' to elicit their exposure to negative reports about personal injury cases and
prejudice against these cases. R. 2223, 6:15-44:15.
6.

In the judge's chambers before the jury panel was brought to the

courtroom for jury selection, defendants requested and the court granted, over objection,
six peremptory challenges to the co-defendants, while allowing plaintiff only three. R.
2223,115:13-116:16.
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7.

After the judge had taken the bench for jury selection, the defendants

revealed to the court and plaintiffs counsel that they had settled all disputes between
them. Plaintiff then, again, objected to additional peremptory challenges for defendants,
but the court, again, overruled plaintiffs objection. R. 2223, 116:8-15; 45:22-48:14.
8.

After the parties exercised their peremptories allocated by the court,

the jury was empaneled and the case was tried between March 26-30, 2006. R. 2223,
48:12-14; RR. 2022-2028.
9.

The trial court had originally instructed the jury panel, as follows:

Mr. Bee asserts that his injury was caused by Anheuser and
Prominence's negligence. Both Anheuser and Prominence deny Mr.
Bee's claim and assert various defenses negating their liability,
including Mr. Bee was negligent himself. Defendant and third party
plaintiff, Anheuser Busch claims that defendant Prominence's
negligence was the cause of Mr. Bee's injury, which Prominence
denies. Further, Anheuser Busch claims that defendant, Prominence,
was negligent when it caused the plaintiffs injury and that it
breached its contract with Anheuser Busch which is also being
denied by Prominence.
R. 2223, 20:17-21:3. However, after disclosing their settlement, defendants requested,
and the court instructed the empaneled jury as follows:
THE COURT:
Mr. Bee asserts that his injury was
caused by Anheuser Busch and Prominence's negligence. Both
Anheuser Busch and Prominence deny Mr. Bee's claim, and they
assert various defenses including claiming that Mr. Bee himself was
negligent.
Further, due to some other things that have occurred prior to
the time of the trial, you need to be aware there are no issues or
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claims in this case from defendant Anheuser Busch against
Prominence for negligence.
R. 2223, 64:7-18. See also R. 2223, 48:15-54:9.
10.

Throughout the trial, plaintiff endeavored to introduce evidence of

Anheuser-Busch's irresponsible, reckless, and deceptive alcohol marketing and
advertisements, and that these were a substantial factor contributing to plaintiffs injuries.
However, the court precluded any and all such evidence as irrelevant. R. 2223, 65:1078:2, 81:4, 105:24, 106:13, 107:13-108:8.
11.

The jury rendered a verdict on March 30, 2007, finding the

defendants negligent and that their negligence caused injury and damages to plaintiff, but
that plaintiff was 75% at fault for his injuries. RR. 2022-2028.
12.

Originally, the jury apportioned 75% of the fault to Anheuser-Busch

and just 10% of the fault to plaintiff, but apparently changed its view and switched the
percentages of fault. Id. R. 2026 at? 10.
13.

After the trial, Anheuser-Busch submitted a proposed judgment to

the court for signature. RR. 2079-2085.
14.

Plaintiff objected, noting that he had been able to secure a copy of

the jury verdict form after the time it was read in trial, which showed that the court had
incorrectly read the verdict form. Id. RR. 2075-2078.
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15.

Contrary to Anheuser Busch' s proposed judgment, the jury had not

answered question 12(B), or, better said, the jury had originally answered 12(B) "No", but
had then scribbled or scratched out its "No" answer to 12(B). R. 2028.
16.

Plaintiff requested that the judgment reflect the jury's actual findings

on the verdict form. Id. RR. 2075-2078.
17.

Plaintiffs submitted a proposed judgment to the court accurately

setting forth the jury's verdict. R. 2086-2090. The trial court, however, overruled or
disregarded Plaintiff's objections and entered Anheuser-Busch's proposed judgment. RR.
2091-2097.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Utah appellate courts have long recognized the duty of trial courts to allow
plaintiffs to discover the exposure of prospective jurors to negative reports about personal
injury cases and the prejudice they hold against such cases. In the matter at bar, however,
the trial court rejected all of plaintiff's requested voir dire designed to discover such
exposure and prejudice. The court then failed to ask any of its own voir dire to elicit the
information. This was prejudicial error since plaintiff s right to the informed exercise of his
peremptory challenges was substantially impaired.
The court committed a second prejudicial error during jury selection when it
granted six peremptory challenges to the co-defendants. The court accepted defendants'
argument that a "substantial controversy" existed since Anheuser Busch had filed a thirdparty complaint against defendant Prominence, asserting Prominence's responsibility for
-7-

plaintiffs injuries and damages. That, however, does not qualify as a "substantial
controversy" under Rule 47(e), Utah R. Civ. P., that would allow the trial court to allocate
additional peremptory challenges. Furthermore, the defendants settled all claims between
them and informed the court of this during the jury selection process. Thus, defendants lost
even the one, albeit inapposite, ground they had asserted for separate sets of peremptory
challenges. Yet, the trial court remained steadfast in its decision to allocate six peremptory
challenges to the co-defendants.
The court committed a third prejudicial error by precluding plaintiff from
showing Anheuser Busch's negligence and recklessness in its irresponsible and deceptive
marketing and advertising practices. The court ruled that the evidence was irrelevant to the
case. In actuality, the evidence was highly probative and critical to show Anheuser Busch's
knowledge, foreseeability of injury, negligence and recklessness.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY REJECTING ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED VOIR
DIRE DESIGNED TO REVEAL PROSPECTIVE JURORS'
EXPOSURE TO NEGATIVE REPORTS OF PERSONAL
INJURY CASES AND PREJUDICE AGAINST SUCH CASES.
Plaintiff requested the following voir dire, (all of which was rejected by the
trial court at defendants' urging), which was designed to elicit juror exposure to negative
reports about personal injury cases and prejudice against these cases:
Question No. 1.
Do you believe a lawsuit is a
proper method of resolving disputes concerning compensation for
personal injuries? Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, Inc., 781
P.2d 445 (Utah 1989). Please explain [in chambers].
Question No. 2.
Have any of you watched, read, or
heard anything that suggests a "lawsuit crisis" or the need for "tort
reform"? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993);
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please explain [in
chambers].
a.
Do you think the article, program, etc.
made some good points?
b.
Did you agree with the points made?
Please explain [in chambers].
c.
Would you be inclined to reduce the
damage award, if any, in this case, because of what you
have watched, read or heard? Please explain [in
chambers].
Question No. 3.
Have any of you watched, read or
heard anything which suggests that jury verdicts are too high or
unreasonable? What have you seen, heard or read? (To be asked of
jurors in chambers.)
a.
Do you personally believe that jury
verdicts are unreasonable?
-9-

b.
Do you believe that monetary limits
should be placed upon the amounts which a jury can
award to an individual who sues for personal injuries?
Question No. 4.
Would you be hesitant to award
compensation for any of the following elements of damages,
provided you first find that the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof
to be entitled to damages:
1.
Past medical expenses?
2.
Past lost wages?
3.
Pain and suffering, including loss of enjoyment
of life?
4.

Punitive damages to punish a wrong-doer?

RR. 1740-1742.
As the court can see, plaintiffs requested voir dire included citations to
Utah appellate precedent. These included citations to the Ostler, Barrett, and Evans
cases. The court of appeals reminded trial courts in Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App.
152, 71 P.3d 601, of the validity of the voir dire principles set forth in these prior
holdings. They establish the right of plaintiffs to voir dire that allows discovery of biases
or prejudice in prospective jurors and which allows plaintiffs the right to the informed
exercise of their peremptory challenges. Id. at f| 10-11. The court also cited holdings of
the supreme court articulating these same principles:
The Utah Supreme Court has instructed "trial judges to take care to
adequately and completely probe jurors on all possible issues of
bias." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991). The purpose
for this probing is to facilitate "both the detection of actual bias and
the collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory
challenge." State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted). "All that is necessary for a voir dire question to be
appropriate is that it allow '[a party] to exercise his peremptory
-10-

challenges more intelligently:" State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845
(Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah
1984)). Accord Saunders, 1999 UT 59 at 134.
Depew, at 112.
Unfortunately, in the matter at bar, the trial court rejected all of plaintiffs
requested voir dire designed to elicit prospective jurors' exposure to negative reports
about personal injury cases, as well as the prejudice of prospective jurors against these
cases. The trial court disregarded the case law and the argument of plaintiffs counsel,
Mr. Raty, and instead was led astray by the arguments of counsel for the defendants, Mr.
Dalton and Mr. Christensen:
THE COURT:
Okay. We' 11 go on the record
with case number 020910483. We're no[w] discussing the potential
voir dire questions and objections. And two, we're addressing the
plaintiffs. All right. You've objected to the questions one through
four, and the reasons were for the record, counsel?
MR. DALTON:
The reasons were that these type
of questions generate - are just intended to generate inflammatory
responses, Your Honor. I had this same experience just in my last
trial where they used these same questions. All the jurors don't like
lawsuits. They don't like high verdicts. When these questions were
last - asked at the last trial that I got at, we spent an inordinate
amount of time bringing people in that said, oh, the McDonald's
case, or the BMW case. And I think a reasonable question is, do you
have a problem with resolving disputes through lawsuits is okay.
But when you start trying to bait people to get, you know, the
conservatives who don't like big verdicts, then you're just going to
get all kinds of responses, and it's intended to just - to try to inflame
people.
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MR. RATY: Your Honor, these are taken right out of
the case law. Our appellate courts have recognized we live in a tort
reform society. The plaintiffs have an absolute right to know the
exposure of these potential jurors to the propaganda that's generated
by these big companies and insurance companies on these issues
[T]hey are right out of the case law, Your Honor, and they're very
fair questions. [W]e have a need and a right to know if we've got
tort reformers on this jury. We have the right to intelligently
exercise our peremptory challenges, and we can't do that if we don't
know what their opinions are. We don't know what they've been
exposed to. These are all legitimate questions. I've always had
these given in my past trials, and they're very appropriate.
THE COURT:
I may reduce them down. I don't
know as I'm going to go into the detail. I think more of a general
flavor of some of these questions would be fine. Like - and like for
example, question three. Do you personally believe that jury verdicts
are unreasonable? Well, that's so broad, at least to me. Which jury
verdict? How much - you know, I - you know. I think MR. CHRISTENSEN:
question and THE COURT:

The court can craft one

Yeah.

R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. Unfortunately, the trial court did not even craft and give the one
question it indicated it would, to address, in some token way, plaintiff's requested voir
dire questions 1 through 4. RR. 2223, 6:15-44:15.
In Barrett, the Utah Court of Appeals was presented with a very similar
situation to the case at bar. There, the trial court had rejected the plaintiffs requested
voir dire designed to discover prospective jurors' exposure to negative reports of medical
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negligence cases. Barrett at 96-97. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the trial court, stating,
We hold only that in cases such as this one, the plaintiff is entitled
during voir dire to elicit information from prospective jurors as to
whether they have read or heard information generally on medical
negligence or tort reform, and to follow up with appropriate
questions if affirmative responses are received.
The trial court's failure to ask prospective jurors threshold questions
sufficient to elicit information on the jurors' possible exposure to
tort-reform and medical negligence information prevented appellant
from detecting possible bias and from intelligently exercising his
peremptory challenges. The trial court's limitation of voir dire
questioning substantially impaired appellant's right to the informed
exercise of his peremptory challenges, and therefore constitutes
reversible error. The judgment in favor of appellee is reversed, and
the case is remanded for a new trial.
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also, Evans v. Doty, 824
P.2d 460, 467(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Just as in Barrett, in the matter at bar, plaintiff had the right to know
whether prospective jurors had read, heard, or seen negative reports about personal injury
cases, and, if so, what the reports said and what the prospective jurors thought about
them. This information, as acknowledged by Barrett, Evans, and Depew was critical to
allow plaintiff to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges and secure possible
excuses for cause. Barrett at 102, Evans at 467. In Evans, the court explained,
In tort cases, and more particularly in medical malpractice cases, we
cannot ignore the reality that potential jurors may have developed
tort-reform biases as a result of an overall exposure to such
-13-

propaganda. Accordingly, in cases such as this one, the plaintiff has
a legitimate interest in discovering which jurors may have read or
heard information generally on medical negligence or tort reform...

Reason suggests that exposure to tort-reform propaganda may foster
a subconscious bias within certain prospective jurors, and, had
[plaintiff] been able to identify those jurors exposed to such
propaganda, she could have more intelligently exercised her
peremptory challenges.
Evans at 467. (Citations omitted). In Barrett, the court added,
In light of the pervasive dissemination of tort-reform information,
and the corresponding potential for general exposure to such
information by potential jurors, a plaintiff is entitled to know which
potential jurors, if any, have been so exposed. Plaintiff is entitled to
such information absent any particular showing of specific
campaigns, advertisements, or literature offered for the purpose of
showing potential prejudice. Failure to ask such questions ignores
the plaintiffs "need to gather information to assist in exercising . . .
peremptory challenges."
Barrett at 101. (Citations omitted).
Based on the holdings of Utah appellate courts, the trial court clearly erred
in rejecting plaintiffs requested voir dire and in failing to ask any other questions to elicit
prospective juror exposure to negative reports of personal injury cases and prejudice
against these cases.
Rejecting the standard requirement that plaintiff show that an absence of
error would have resulted in a different outcome, Barrett held that in the context of voir
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dire questioning, prejudicial error is shown if the plaintiffs right to the informed exercise
of peremptory challenges has been substantially impaired:
An appellant claiming that the trial court's unreasonable limitation of
voir dire substantially impaired his ability to exercise peremptory
challenges simply cannot prove, in the traditional way, that prejudice
resulted from the error. Appellant cannot show with any certainty
that had certain questions been asked, particular responses would
have been received; that certain jurors would then have been
challenged for cause or peremptorily; and that particular, more
favorably predisposed jurors would have been seated instead, who
would have deliberated to a different result. Accordingly, in this
context, we apply the test enunciated in Hornsby: Prejudicial error is
shown if the appellant's right to the informed exercise of peremptory
challenges has been "substantially impaired." 758 P.2d at 933.
Barrett at 103. Similarly, in Depew, the court determined the failure to ask questions to
elicit biases of prospective jurors was, of itself, prejudicial, and that no showing of
"actual prejudice" was required since there was no way for the plaintiff to show any
particular juror as biased or prejudiced. Depew, at fP8-34.
As in Barrett, in the case at bar, the trial court rejected all of plaintiff s
requested voir dire to discover prospective juror exposure and biases. The trial court
asked no meaningful question that would elicit disclosure by prospective jurors of
exposure to negative reports on negligence cases and their effect. Thus, an entire jury
was allowed to sit in judgment of a personal injury case without plaintiffs having any
knowledge of the jurors' exposure to negative reports of and prejudice against personal
injury cases. The trial court's conduct was prejudicial since it substantially impaired the
-15-

plaintiff's right to meaningful voir dire and to the informed exercise of their peremptory
challenges. The court should, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for a new trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY GRANTING THE CO-DEFENDANTS TWICE THE
NUMBER OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ALLOWED
TO PLAINTIFF.
While in the judge's chambers on the morning of the first day of trial, codefendants requested and the court granted co-defendants six peremptory challenges
(three for each), in comparison to just three for plaintiff. Defendants argued, and the
court accepted the argument that the third-party complaint filed by Anheuser-Busch
against Prominence meant that a "substantial controversy" existed between them under
Rule 47, Utah R. Civ. P. The court thus believed it had discretion to award the codefendants additional peremptory challenges. However, Utah appellate case law makes
abundantly clear that such a third-party complaint does not constitute a "substantial
controversy" for purposes of Rule 47(e). See discussion below. Furthermore, after the
court granted the additional peremptory challenges, co-defendants informed the court that
they had reached a settlement of all claims between them. Nonetheless, over plaintiffs
renewed objection, the court still granted six peremptory excuses to the co-defendants.
Rule 47(e), Utah R. Civ. P. provides in pertinent part,
-16-

Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. Several
defendants or several plaintiffs shall be considered as a single party
for the purposes of making peremptory challenges unless there is a
substantial controversy between them, in which case the court shall
allow as many additional peremptory challenges as is just.
Utah appellate courts have defined what constitutes a "substantial
controversy" for purposes of Rule 47(e), and explained the very limited discretion of the
trial court in deciding when to grant additional peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Carrier
v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997). The courts' holdings make clear that
the co-defendants in the matter at bar had no "substantial controversy" between them,
and that the trial court: committed prejudicial error by awarding defendants six peremptory
challenges.
In Carrier, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the Utah Court of Appeals'
ruling that the trial court had erred in granting six peremptory challenges to codefendants. Id., at 349, 357 and Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 909 P.2d 271 (Ct. App.
1995), cert, granted, 920 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1996). Plaintiff Carrier was involved in a car
accident with defendant Smith who, at the time, was working for defendant Pro-Tech
Restoration. Both defendants answered Carrier's complaint by asserting Carrier was
more at fault than they. Carrier, 944 P.2d at 349. Initially, Smith and Pro-Tech were
represented by the same attorney, but early on in the litigation, Smith left Pro-Tech's
employ and testified at deposition that Pro-Tech instructed him to lie so as to place more
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blame for the accident on plaintiff Carrier. Id. This lead to Smith hiring separate
counsel. Id.
At trial, the court granted each co-defendant three peremptory challenges,
stating only "[Tjhey are disparate enough just by the nature of the case to permit
[allocating separate sets of peremptory challenges]." Id. at 350. At the end of trial, the
jury returned a verdict finding plaintiff Carrier 60% at fault. Id. Carrier appealed. Id.
Affirming the court of appeals reversal and remand for a new trial, the
supreme court stated that the "facts fall far short of supporting a finding that a 'substantial
controversy' existed between the defendants." Id. at 353. The court made clear that
issues of apportionment of fault between defendants do not constitute a "substantial
controversy" for purposes of Rule 47(e), that a "substantial controversy" typically
involves a cross-claim not derivative of plaintiffs claim against the defendants. Id. at
351-52. The court said,
[W]e stated in Sutton that in "cases where defendants are joined, in
which one seeks to blame the other for the wrong or injury of which
the plaintiff complains[,] . . . there is no substantial reason why the
defendants, for purposes of a peremptory challenge, should not be
considered as being on the same side." 249 P. at 458. Additionally,
we listed several scenarios in Randle that will not meet the
"substantial controversy" standard. This list, which incorporated the
principles announced in Sutton, includes separate answers, separate
counsel, uncooperativeness, liability shifting, different defenses or
claims resting on different facts or legal theories, and derivative
cross-claims. 862 P.2d at 1332-33. This list leaves only a few
scenarios that can constitute a "substantial controversy." Moreover,
the possible scenarios that might meet the "substantial controversy"
-18-

standard are not particularly complicated. For example, a co-party
either has or has not filed a nonderivative cross-claim. See id. at
1333.
Id. at 351-52. Citing Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). The
court explained what was at stake in granting additional peremptory challenges to one
side:
Peremptory challenges are a powerful tool for shaping the jury that
hears the case and ultimately determines which side prevails.
Therefore, the trial court should avoid lightly giving one side
additional challenges. As we noted in Randle,"[G]ranting co-parties
on one side of a lawsuit additional challenges places the opposing
side at a disadvantage." Id. at 1333. Consequently, we advised trial
judges to "carefully appraise the degree of adverseness among coparties and determine whether that adverseness truly warrants giving
that side more challenges than the other." Id.
Id. at 352.
In the matter at bar, there was no "substantial controversy" as that term has
been defined by Utah appellate courts. The trial court had no basis to grant separate
peremptory challenges just because Anheuser Busch had filed a third party suit asserting
that Prominence was responsible for plaintiff Michael Bee's injuries and damages. This
was derivative of Mr. Bee's complaint against Anheuser Busch, not a claim independent
of plaintiff's complaint. Furthermore, the co-defendants had settled their claims and
informed the court and plaintiff of that before any prospective juror had been dismissed.
The court could and should have corrected the number of peremptory challenges allotted.
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In Carrier, the supreme court also upheld the court of appeal's conclusion
that the trial court's error was prejudicial and warranted a new trial. Explaining, the court
quoted from Randle, as follows:
A side that has additional peremptory challenges has the opportunity
to shape the jury to its advantage. Although that self-evident
statement does not itself show prejudice, the size of the disparity in
the peremptory challenges allowed in this case was significant[,
twelve for the defendants and four for the plaintiff!. Requiring a
party to show prejudice in such circumstances is to require the
impossible." To show actual prejudice, the complaining litigant
would be required to discover the unknowable and to reconstruct
what might have been and never was, a jury properly constituted
after running the gauntlet of challenge[s] performed in accordance
with the prescribed rule of the game.'" Blades v. DaFoe, 704 P.2d
317, 322 (Colo. 1985) (quoting Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Cook, 590 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Ky. 1979)). Accordingly, we hold
that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to grant [the
defendants] six peremptory challenges. 862 P.2d at 1334 . . . .
Id. at 353.
Just as in Carrier and Randle, in the matter at bar, the trial court's error in
granting additional peremptory challenges to co-defendants was prejudicial. As in those
cases, the court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a
new trial. Id., at 349, 357 and Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 909 P.2d 271 (Ct. App.
1995), cert, granted, 920 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1996).
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY PRECLUDING ANY AND ALL EVIDENCE OF
ANHEUSER BUSCH'S IRRESPONSIBLE, RECKLESS, AND
DECEPTIVE ALCOHOL MARKETING AND
ADVERTISEMENTS.
In addition to the proof of defendants' negligence in serving plaintiff
alcohol to his intoxication and bringing him onto the ice to compete without any
protective gear, at trial, plaintiff attempted to demonstrate Anheuser Busch's negligence
and recklessness through evidence of its marketing and advertising practices which
contributed to plaintiff's alcohol consumption, intoxication, and ill-advised participation
in Anheuser Busch's contest. A large part of plaintiffs proof in the case consisted of
such evidence. SeeR. 2223, 65:10-75:2, 81:12-82:4, 105:24-106:13, 107:13-108:8.
However, the court precluded any and all such evidence as irrelevant. Id.
The excluded evidence was relevant because, under Rule 401, Utah Rules
of Evidence, it tended to make defendants' negligence and recklessness more probable.
As set forth in plaintiff's proffers, Anheuser Busch had long been involved in the
business of brewing and selling alcoholic beverages and knew of the great danger of
alcohol-related injuries. However, Anheuser Busch did not warn the public, and instead
portrayed the effects of alcohol consumption in a false light, as simply pleasurable and
totally safe. The precluded evidence would have added substantially to the proof of
Anheuser Busch's negligence and recklessness. The excluded evidence was critical,
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because, as the court can see, comparative fault and punitive damages were issues over
which the jury apparently greatly vacillated.
CONCLUSION
The court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case
for a new trial, since the trial court committed prejudicial errors in rejecting plaintiffs
requested voir dire, to discover prospective juror exposure to negative reports of personal
injury cases and prejudice against such cases. The trial court also committed prejudicial
error in granting co-defendants six peremptory challenges, although there was no
"substantial controversy" that would allow the trial court to allocate additional challenges.
Finally, the court committed also committed prejudicial error in precluding plaintiff from
adducing evidence of irresponsible, reckless, and deceptive marketing and advertising,
which contributed to the cause of plaintiff's injuries and damages.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Michael Bee respectfully requests that the Utah
Court of Appeals reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new
trial.
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 3 _ day of May, 2008.

Matthew H. Raty
Cory B Mattson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF
was served upon appellee's counsel at the address listed below, by depositing the same in
the United States mail, postage pre-paid on the ffi v day of May, 2008.
Attorney for Anheuser Busch Co.
Peter H. Christensen
STRONG & HANNI
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

Q \Bee\P\Appeal\AppellantsBnet wpd
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ADDENDUM
Addendum 1:

RR. 1740-1744, Plaintiff s Requested Voir Dire.

Addendum 2:

R. 2226, 1:6-3:1, Trial Court's oral ruling on Plaintiffs Requested
Voir Dire.
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Matthew H. Raty (#6635)
LAW OFFICE OF MATTHEW H. RATY, PC
New England Professional Plaza
9677 South 700 East, Suite D
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801)495-2252
Fax:(801)495-2262
Attorney for Plaintiff
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL BEE,
Plaintiff,

)
)

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
VOIR DIRE

\)
)
l
)

Civil No. 020910483

v.
ANHEUSER BUSCH, INCORPORATED, a
Missouri Corporation, and PROMINENCE,
INC., a Nevada Corporation.
Defendants.
ANHEUSER BUSCH, INCORPORATED, a
Missouri Corporation.
Third-Party Plaintiff,
V
V,

1
J

PROMINENCE, INC., a Nevada Corporation, )
Third- Party Defendant.

)

Plaintiff proposes the following Voir Dire questions:

Judge Robert P. Faust

Question No, 1.

Do you believe a lawsuit is a proper method of resolving disputes

concerning compensation for personal injuries? Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, Inc., 781 P.2d
445 (Utah 1989). Please explain [in chambers].
Question No. 2.

Have any of you watched, read, or heard anything that suggests a

"lawsuit crisis" or the need for "tort reform"? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993);
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please explain [in chambers].
a.

Do you think the article, program, etc. made some good points?

b.

Did you agree with the points made? Please explain [in chambers].

c.

Would you be inclined to reduce the damage award, if any, in this case,

because of what you have watched, read or heard? Please explain [in chambers].
Question No, 3.

Have any of you watched, read or heard anything which suggests that

jury verdicts are too high or unreasonable? What have you seen, heard or read? (To be asked of
jurors in chambers.)
a.

Do you personally believe that jury verdicts are unreasonable?

b.

Do you believe that monetary limits should be placed upon the amounts

which a jury can award to an individual who sues for personal injuries?
Question No. 4.

Would you be hesitant to award compensation for any of the following

elements of damages, provided you first find that the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof to be
entitled to damages:
1.

Past medical expenses?

2.

Past lost wages?

3.

Pain and suffering, including loss of enjoyment of life?

4.

Punitive damages to punish a wrong-doer?

Question No, 5.

Do you drink alcohol, and, if so, how much?

Question No, 6.

Does anyone close to you drink alcohol, and, if so, how much?

Question No, 7.

Do you purchase Anheuser-Busch products, such as Budweiser Beer,

Bud Light, or any of the beers manufactured by Anheuser-Busch?
Question No, 8,

Would any of you have difficulty awarding damages against the

Defendant Anheuser-Busch because of a like you have for or connection you feel to Anheuser-Busch
or its products?
Question No, 9,

Do you, or does anyone close to you, work for the alcohol industry or

have stock, other ownership, or financial interest in Anheuser-Busch or another alcohol
manufacturer?
Question No. 10.

Do you believe that as a juror you should be able to disregard the

judge's instructions and decide a case based on your own beliefs? Please explain.
Question No. 11.

Have you or any of your close relatives or friends worked or do you

or they now work in any aspect of the insurance industry (insurance salesman, employee of an
insurance company, adjuster, underwriter, or anything similar)? Please explain. Evans v. Doty, 824
P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991).

Question No. 12.

Has any juror here been a party to a civil lawsuit? As a result of that

experience do you believe that you would be more sympathetic to one party or the other?

&

DATED this j L L day of March, 2007.

Matthew H. Raty

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED VOIR DIRE were served upon the
defendants at the addresses listed below, via fax and first class U.S. Mail, on this c ' day of March,
2007.
Attorney for Anheuser Busch Co.
Peter Christensen
STRONG & HANNI
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Fax: 596-1508

Q:\Bee\P\VoirDire

Attorney for Prominence. Inc.
Donald Dalton
P.O. Box 58084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158
Fax: 583-2519

Tab 2

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MARCH 26, 2007 AM
HONORABLE ROBERT FAUST, JUDGE PRESIDING
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification
was difficult due to positions and camera angle)
P R O C E E D I N G S
9:09:44

THE COURT:

number 020910483.

Okay.

We'll go on the record with case

We're not discussing the potential voir

dire questions and objections.
plaintiffs.

All right.

And two, we're addressing the

You've objected to the questions one

through four, and the reasons were for the record, counsel?
MR. DALTON:

The reasons were that these types of

questions generate - are just intended to generate
inflammatory responses, Your Honor.

I had this same

experience just in my last trial where they used these same
questions.

All the jurors don't like lawsuits.

like high verdicts.

They don't

When these questions were last - asked

at the last trial that I got at, we spent an inordinate
amount of time bringing people in that said, oh, the
McDonald's case, or the BMW case. And I think a reasonable
question is, do you have a problem with resolving disputes
through lawsuits is okay.

But when you start trying to bait

people to get, you know, the conservatives who don't like big
verdicts, then you're just going to get all kinds of
responses, and it's intended to just - to try to inflame
people.

MR. RATY:
the case law.

Your Honor, these are taken right out of

Our appellate courts have recognized we live

in a tort reform society.

The plaintiffs have an absolute

right to know the exposure of these potential jurors to the
propaganda that's generated by these big companies and
insurance companies on these issues. And, you know, I don't
really want to threaten you and say, you know, that would be
prejudicial error and not to give these.

But they are right

out of the case law, Your Honor, and they're very fair
questions.

When we have a need and a right to know if we've

got tort reformers on this jury.

We have the right to

intelligently exercise our preemptory challenges, and we
can't do that if we don't know what their opinions are. We
don't know what they've been exposed to.
legitimate questions.

These are all

I've always had these given in my past

trials, and they're very appropriate.
THE COURT:

I may reduce them down.

as I'm going to go into the detail.

I don't know

I think more of a

general flavor of some of these questions would be fine.
Like - and like for example, question three.

Do you

personally believe that jury verdicts are unreasonable?
Well, that's so broad, at least to me.
How much - you know, I - you know.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
and -

Which jury verdict?

I think -

The Court can craft one question

THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
MR. RATY:

- that -

To disclose of that?

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

Figures that out.

What about the alcohol issues, five

through MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Well, I think, again, there the

Court can reduce it maybe to one.

We have a couple questions

in our - if you have a problem with the beer company, and I
think the Court can probably reduce it to a question that
this case may have some, you know, evidence regarding the
consumption of alcohol, you know, is that going to cause a
problem for you?

Again there, Your Honor, I think you're

going to get all - you're taking a risk of having a
tremendous amount of responses, but I do understand why
counsel has to ask it.
MR. RATY:
THE COURT:

Oh, yeah.

We've got to ask it.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

And so I just don't think it

needs to be asked repetitively.
MR. RATY:

There's nothing repetitive about five

through THE COURT:

I don't know if I want to ask them if

they personally drink alcohol or not.

I think we could

certainly say, this issue involves - the case involves

